From 6121217df5ceb4a12e82e889ac6a3ba757e0ea3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Gultsch Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 10:39:36 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] fixed auth --- .../crypto/sasl/ScramMechanism.java | 379 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 189 insertions(+), 190 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/main/java/eu/siacs/conversations/crypto/sasl/ScramMechanism.java b/src/main/java/eu/siacs/conversations/crypto/sasl/ScramMechanism.java index c3cbb545f..df308241b 100644 --- a/src/main/java/eu/siacs/conversations/crypto/sasl/ScramMechanism.java +++ b/src/main/java/eu/siacs/conversations/crypto/sasl/ScramMechanism.java @@ -20,215 +20,214 @@ import eu.siacs.conversations.xml.TagWriter; @TargetApi(Build.VERSION_CODES.HONEYCOMB_MR1) abstract class ScramMechanism extends SaslMechanism { - // TODO: When channel binding (SCRAM-SHA1-PLUS) is supported in future, generalize this to indicate support and/or usage. - private final static String GS2_HEADER = "n,,"; - private String clientFirstMessageBare; - private final String clientNonce; - private byte[] serverSignature = null; - static HMac HMAC; - static Digest DIGEST; - private static final byte[] CLIENT_KEY_BYTES = "Client Key".getBytes(); - private static final byte[] SERVER_KEY_BYTES = "Server Key".getBytes(); + // TODO: When channel binding (SCRAM-SHA1-PLUS) is supported in future, generalize this to indicate support and/or usage. + private final static String GS2_HEADER = "n,,"; + private static final byte[] CLIENT_KEY_BYTES = "Client Key".getBytes(); + private static final byte[] SERVER_KEY_BYTES = "Server Key".getBytes(); + private static final LruCache CACHE; + static HMac HMAC; + static Digest DIGEST; - private static class KeyPair { - final byte[] clientKey; - final byte[] serverKey; + static { + CACHE = new LruCache(10) { + protected KeyPair create(final String k) { + // Map keys are "bytesToHex(JID),bytesToHex(password),bytesToHex(salt),iterations,SASL-Mechanism". + // Changing any of these values forces a cache miss. `CryptoHelper.bytesToHex()' + // is applied to prevent commas in the strings breaking things. + final String[] kparts = k.split(",", 5); + try { + final byte[] saltedPassword, serverKey, clientKey; + saltedPassword = hi(CryptoHelper.hexToString(kparts[1]).getBytes(), + Base64.decode(CryptoHelper.hexToString(kparts[2]), Base64.DEFAULT), Integer.valueOf(kparts[3])); + serverKey = hmac(saltedPassword, SERVER_KEY_BYTES); + clientKey = hmac(saltedPassword, CLIENT_KEY_BYTES); - KeyPair(final byte[] clientKey, final byte[] serverKey) { - this.clientKey = clientKey; - this.serverKey = serverKey; - } - } + return new KeyPair(clientKey, serverKey); + } catch (final InvalidKeyException | NumberFormatException e) { + return null; + } + } + }; + } - static { - CACHE = new LruCache(10) { - protected KeyPair create(final String k) { - // Map keys are "bytesToHex(JID),bytesToHex(password),bytesToHex(salt),iterations,SASL-Mechanism". - // Changing any of these values forces a cache miss. `CryptoHelper.bytesToHex()' - // is applied to prevent commas in the strings breaking things. - final String[] kparts = k.split(",", 4); - try { - final byte[] saltedPassword, serverKey, clientKey; - saltedPassword = hi(CryptoHelper.hexToString(kparts[1]).getBytes(), - Base64.decode(CryptoHelper.hexToString(kparts[2]), Base64.DEFAULT), Integer.valueOf(kparts[3])); - serverKey = hmac(saltedPassword, SERVER_KEY_BYTES); - clientKey = hmac(saltedPassword, CLIENT_KEY_BYTES); + private final String clientNonce; + protected State state = State.INITIAL; + private String clientFirstMessageBare; + private byte[] serverSignature = null; - return new KeyPair(clientKey, serverKey); - } catch (final InvalidKeyException | NumberFormatException e) { - return null; - } - } - }; - } + ScramMechanism(final TagWriter tagWriter, final Account account, final SecureRandom rng) { + super(tagWriter, account, rng); - private static final LruCache CACHE; + // This nonce should be different for each authentication attempt. + clientNonce = CryptoHelper.random(100, rng); + clientFirstMessageBare = ""; + } - protected State state = State.INITIAL; + private static synchronized byte[] hmac(final byte[] key, final byte[] input) + throws InvalidKeyException { + HMAC.init(new KeyParameter(key)); + HMAC.update(input, 0, input.length); + final byte[] out = new byte[HMAC.getMacSize()]; + HMAC.doFinal(out, 0); + return out; + } - ScramMechanism(final TagWriter tagWriter, final Account account, final SecureRandom rng) { - super(tagWriter, account, rng); + public static synchronized byte[] digest(byte[] bytes) { + DIGEST.reset(); + DIGEST.update(bytes, 0, bytes.length); + final byte[] out = new byte[DIGEST.getDigestSize()]; + DIGEST.doFinal(out, 0); + return out; + } - // This nonce should be different for each authentication attempt. - clientNonce = CryptoHelper.random(100,rng); - clientFirstMessageBare = ""; - } + /* + * Hi() is, essentially, PBKDF2 [RFC2898] with HMAC() as the + * pseudorandom function (PRF) and with dkLen == output length of + * HMAC() == output length of H(). + */ + private static synchronized byte[] hi(final byte[] key, final byte[] salt, final int iterations) + throws InvalidKeyException { + byte[] u = hmac(key, CryptoHelper.concatenateByteArrays(salt, CryptoHelper.ONE)); + byte[] out = u.clone(); + for (int i = 1; i < iterations; i++) { + u = hmac(key, u); + for (int j = 0; j < u.length; j++) { + out[j] ^= u[j]; + } + } + return out; + } - @Override - public String getClientFirstMessage() { - if (clientFirstMessageBare.isEmpty() && state == State.INITIAL) { - clientFirstMessageBare = "n=" + CryptoHelper.saslEscape(CryptoHelper.saslPrep(account.getUsername())) + - ",r=" + this.clientNonce; - state = State.AUTH_TEXT_SENT; - } - return Base64.encodeToString( - (GS2_HEADER + clientFirstMessageBare).getBytes(Charset.defaultCharset()), - Base64.NO_WRAP); - } + @Override + public String getClientFirstMessage() { + if (clientFirstMessageBare.isEmpty() && state == State.INITIAL) { + clientFirstMessageBare = "n=" + CryptoHelper.saslEscape(CryptoHelper.saslPrep(account.getUsername())) + + ",r=" + this.clientNonce; + state = State.AUTH_TEXT_SENT; + } + return Base64.encodeToString( + (GS2_HEADER + clientFirstMessageBare).getBytes(Charset.defaultCharset()), + Base64.NO_WRAP); + } - @Override - public String getResponse(final String challenge) throws AuthenticationException { - switch (state) { - case AUTH_TEXT_SENT: - if (challenge == null) { - throw new AuthenticationException("challenge can not be null"); - } - byte[] serverFirstMessage; - try { - serverFirstMessage = Base64.decode(challenge, Base64.DEFAULT); - } catch (IllegalArgumentException e) { - throw new AuthenticationException("Unable to decode server challenge",e); - } - final Tokenizer tokenizer = new Tokenizer(serverFirstMessage); - String nonce = ""; - int iterationCount = -1; - String salt = ""; - for (final String token : tokenizer) { - if (token.charAt(1) == '=') { - switch (token.charAt(0)) { - case 'i': - try { - iterationCount = Integer.parseInt(token.substring(2)); - } catch (final NumberFormatException e) { - throw new AuthenticationException(e); - } - break; - case 's': - salt = token.substring(2); - break; - case 'r': - nonce = token.substring(2); - break; - case 'm': - /* - * RFC 5802: - * m: This attribute is reserved for future extensibility. In this - * version of SCRAM, its presence in a client or a server message - * MUST cause authentication failure when the attribute is parsed by - * the other end. - */ - throw new AuthenticationException("Server sent reserved token: `m'"); - } - } - } + @Override + public String getResponse(final String challenge) throws AuthenticationException { + switch (state) { + case AUTH_TEXT_SENT: + if (challenge == null) { + throw new AuthenticationException("challenge can not be null"); + } + byte[] serverFirstMessage; + try { + serverFirstMessage = Base64.decode(challenge, Base64.DEFAULT); + } catch (IllegalArgumentException e) { + throw new AuthenticationException("Unable to decode server challenge", e); + } + final Tokenizer tokenizer = new Tokenizer(serverFirstMessage); + String nonce = ""; + int iterationCount = -1; + String salt = ""; + for (final String token : tokenizer) { + if (token.charAt(1) == '=') { + switch (token.charAt(0)) { + case 'i': + try { + iterationCount = Integer.parseInt(token.substring(2)); + } catch (final NumberFormatException e) { + throw new AuthenticationException(e); + } + break; + case 's': + salt = token.substring(2); + break; + case 'r': + nonce = token.substring(2); + break; + case 'm': + /* + * RFC 5802: + * m: This attribute is reserved for future extensibility. In this + * version of SCRAM, its presence in a client or a server message + * MUST cause authentication failure when the attribute is parsed by + * the other end. + */ + throw new AuthenticationException("Server sent reserved token: `m'"); + } + } + } - if (iterationCount < 0) { - throw new AuthenticationException("Server did not send iteration count"); - } - if (nonce.isEmpty() || !nonce.startsWith(clientNonce)) { - throw new AuthenticationException("Server nonce does not contain client nonce: " + nonce); - } - if (salt.isEmpty()) { - throw new AuthenticationException("Server sent empty salt"); - } + if (iterationCount < 0) { + throw new AuthenticationException("Server did not send iteration count"); + } + if (nonce.isEmpty() || !nonce.startsWith(clientNonce)) { + throw new AuthenticationException("Server nonce does not contain client nonce: " + nonce); + } + if (salt.isEmpty()) { + throw new AuthenticationException("Server sent empty salt"); + } - final String clientFinalMessageWithoutProof = "c=" + Base64.encodeToString( - GS2_HEADER.getBytes(), Base64.NO_WRAP) + ",r=" + nonce; - final byte[] authMessage = (clientFirstMessageBare + ',' + new String(serverFirstMessage) + ',' - + clientFinalMessageWithoutProof).getBytes(); + final String clientFinalMessageWithoutProof = "c=" + Base64.encodeToString( + GS2_HEADER.getBytes(), Base64.NO_WRAP) + ",r=" + nonce; + final byte[] authMessage = (clientFirstMessageBare + ',' + new String(serverFirstMessage) + ',' + + clientFinalMessageWithoutProof).getBytes(); - // Map keys are "bytesToHex(JID),bytesToHex(password),bytesToHex(salt),iterations,SASL-Mechanism". - final KeyPair keys = CACHE.get( - CryptoHelper.bytesToHex(account.getJid().asBareJid().toString().getBytes()) + "," - + CryptoHelper.bytesToHex(account.getPassword().getBytes()) + "," - + CryptoHelper.bytesToHex(salt.getBytes()) + "," - + String.valueOf(iterationCount) - + getMechanism() - ); - if (keys == null) { - throw new AuthenticationException("Invalid keys generated"); - } - final byte[] clientSignature; - try { - serverSignature = hmac(keys.serverKey, authMessage); - final byte[] storedKey = digest(keys.clientKey); + // Map keys are "bytesToHex(JID),bytesToHex(password),bytesToHex(salt),iterations,SASL-Mechanism". + final KeyPair keys = CACHE.get( + CryptoHelper.bytesToHex(account.getJid().asBareJid().toString().getBytes()) + "," + + CryptoHelper.bytesToHex(account.getPassword().getBytes()) + "," + + CryptoHelper.bytesToHex(salt.getBytes()) + "," + + String.valueOf(iterationCount) + "," + + getMechanism() + ); + if (keys == null) { + throw new AuthenticationException("Invalid keys generated"); + } + final byte[] clientSignature; + try { + serverSignature = hmac(keys.serverKey, authMessage); + final byte[] storedKey = digest(keys.clientKey); - clientSignature = hmac(storedKey, authMessage); + clientSignature = hmac(storedKey, authMessage); - } catch (final InvalidKeyException e) { - throw new AuthenticationException(e); - } + } catch (final InvalidKeyException e) { + throw new AuthenticationException(e); + } - final byte[] clientProof = new byte[keys.clientKey.length]; + final byte[] clientProof = new byte[keys.clientKey.length]; - for (int i = 0; i < clientProof.length; i++) { - clientProof[i] = (byte) (keys.clientKey[i] ^ clientSignature[i]); - } + for (int i = 0; i < clientProof.length; i++) { + clientProof[i] = (byte) (keys.clientKey[i] ^ clientSignature[i]); + } - final String clientFinalMessage = clientFinalMessageWithoutProof + ",p=" + - Base64.encodeToString(clientProof, Base64.NO_WRAP); - state = State.RESPONSE_SENT; - return Base64.encodeToString(clientFinalMessage.getBytes(), Base64.NO_WRAP); - case RESPONSE_SENT: - try { - final String clientCalculatedServerFinalMessage = "v=" + - Base64.encodeToString(serverSignature, Base64.NO_WRAP); - if (!clientCalculatedServerFinalMessage.equals(new String(Base64.decode(challenge, Base64.DEFAULT)))) { - throw new Exception(); - } - state = State.VALID_SERVER_RESPONSE; - return ""; - } catch(Exception e) { - throw new AuthenticationException("Server final message does not match calculated final message"); - } - default: - throw new InvalidStateException(state); - } - } + final String clientFinalMessage = clientFinalMessageWithoutProof + ",p=" + + Base64.encodeToString(clientProof, Base64.NO_WRAP); + state = State.RESPONSE_SENT; + return Base64.encodeToString(clientFinalMessage.getBytes(), Base64.NO_WRAP); + case RESPONSE_SENT: + try { + final String clientCalculatedServerFinalMessage = "v=" + + Base64.encodeToString(serverSignature, Base64.NO_WRAP); + if (!clientCalculatedServerFinalMessage.equals(new String(Base64.decode(challenge, Base64.DEFAULT)))) { + throw new Exception(); + } + state = State.VALID_SERVER_RESPONSE; + return ""; + } catch (Exception e) { + throw new AuthenticationException("Server final message does not match calculated final message"); + } + default: + throw new InvalidStateException(state); + } + } - private static synchronized byte[] hmac(final byte[] key, final byte[] input) - throws InvalidKeyException { - HMAC.init(new KeyParameter(key)); - HMAC.update(input, 0, input.length); - final byte[] out = new byte[HMAC.getMacSize()]; - HMAC.doFinal(out, 0); - return out; - } + private static class KeyPair { + final byte[] clientKey; + final byte[] serverKey; - public static synchronized byte[] digest(byte[] bytes) { - DIGEST.reset(); - DIGEST.update(bytes, 0, bytes.length); - final byte[] out = new byte[DIGEST.getDigestSize()]; - DIGEST.doFinal(out, 0); - return out; - } - - /* - * Hi() is, essentially, PBKDF2 [RFC2898] with HMAC() as the - * pseudorandom function (PRF) and with dkLen == output length of - * HMAC() == output length of H(). - */ - private static synchronized byte[] hi(final byte[] key, final byte[] salt, final int iterations) - throws InvalidKeyException { - byte[] u = hmac(key, CryptoHelper.concatenateByteArrays(salt, CryptoHelper.ONE)); - byte[] out = u.clone(); - for (int i = 1; i < iterations; i++) { - u = hmac(key, u); - for (int j = 0; j < u.length; j++) { - out[j] ^= u[j]; - } - } - return out; - } + KeyPair(final byte[] clientKey, final byte[] serverKey) { + this.clientKey = clientKey; + this.serverKey = serverKey; + } + } }